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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

CLASS SUITS AND THE FEDERAL RULES*
By HIRAM H. LESARt
I. THE FEDERAL RuLEs

N sharp contrast with the narrow rules of joinder then prevailing in suits at law, ancient equity practice, in order that
complete justice might be done in one action, required all persons
materially interested in the subject-matter or the object of a suit
to be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or defendants.' A
companion principle was to the effect that a person must have
his day in court before an adjudication could affect him. Yet
it became apparent that in some cases adherence to these rules
would work a denial of justice. To avoid that result and still
protect persons not actually parties to the suit, the procedural
device of a representative suit was early developed and formed an
2
exception to the equity rules of joinder. Where the members of
a class were so numerous that it was impracticable to join them all,
a few were permitted to sue, or to be sued, on behalf of the
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
*Proposed Federal Rule 23 on class actions was drafted by Professor
J. W. Moore, of the University of Chicago, whose analysis of the rule as first
drafted appears in his article, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some
Problems Raised by The Preliminary Draft, (1937) 25 Geo. L. J. 551, 570
et seq. The advisory committee, however, rejected that part of Professor
Moore's suggested rule which dealt with the effect of the judgment and the
requisites of jurisdiction, on the ground that these questions were substantive
and not procedural. See comment after Rule 23, Proposed Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts of the United States (Report of the
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, April, 1937). The
present paper, written while the writer was a Sterling Fellow at the Yale
Law School (1936-1937), presents his interpretation and criticism of the
proposed rule, based upon an examination of the leading articles and
principal federal decisions, on class suits. The writer is indebted to the
work of Professor Moore, particularly his keen analysis of class actions
into three types as stated in Federal Rule 23.
11 Daniell. Chancery Pleading & Practice, 6th Am. ed., 192, where the
author points out that equity required the plaintiff to bring in as plaintiffs
or defendants all persons who were necessary to enable it to do complete
justice, "and that he should so far bind the rights of all persons interested
in the subject as to render performance of the decree which he seeks safe
to the party called upon to perform it, by preventing his being sued or
again respecting the same matter either at Law or in Equity."
molested
2
Some of the earlier cases were: Brown v. Vermuden, (1676) 1 Cas.
in Ch. 272 (suit against a parish to establish the right to a tithe) ; City of
London v. Richmond, (1701) Prec. Ch. 156, 2 Vern. 421 (suit against
shareholders); Cockburn v. Thompson, (1809) 16 Ves. 321 (suit by members of a voluntary association) ; Meux v. Maltby, (1818) 2 Swan. 277 (suit
against some members of a joint stock company). See also Madox. Firma
Burgi. ch. 7, p. 136.
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whole class.3 This was a matter of indulgence, since joinder
otherwise would have been required.
But there also developed in equity practice a type of joinder
of parties which was not required but optional with the plaintiffs.
So joinder was deemed permissive "when owners of separate
lands united to enjoin a common injury or nuisance or the levy
of an illegal tax or rate; when persons injured by the same or
identical fraudulent misrepresentations sued to be put in statu quo;
and when creditors who had recovered separate judgments
against a common debtor brought a creditor's bill. '" Representative or class suits came to be employed in most, if not all, of
these situations. It must be remembered, however, that, among
other reasons, joinder was here allowd in order to prevent a
multiplicity of suits, to avert delay in proceedings and to save
expense. The allowance of a representative suit in these cases,
then, was a matter of convenience.
With the advent of reformed procedure, the equity doctrine
found expression in the codes, the usual provision reading as
follows:
"When the question is one of common or general interest of many
persons, or where the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable
to bring them all before
5 the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the benefit of all."1
Other statutes begin "when the subject-matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many persons" and
"where there are numerous persons having the same interest in
one cause or matter. ' 7 A great deal of confusion has arisen as to
what constitutes "a common or general interest," "the subjectmatter of the controversy," and "the same interest in one cause
or matter;" and there have been conflicting statements as to
what situations were meant to be embraced within the clause, "or
where the parties are numerous."" Sometimes the courts have
3

See Cooper, Equity Pleading 39; 1 Daniell, Chancery Pleading &

Practice, 6th Am. ed., 235 et seq.; Story, Equity Pleading, 19th ed.. sec.

94 et4 seq.
Clark, Code Planning 248.
5Alabama, Code (Michie, 1928) sec. 5701. These statutes are collected in Clark, Code Pleading 277, n. 182 and Wheaton, Representative
Suits Involving Numerous Litigants (1934) 19 Cornell L. Q. 399, n. 1.
6Philippine,
Code Civ. Proc. (De Joya, 1925) sec. 118.
7
Rules of Sup. Ct. England, (1935) Order XVI, Rule 9.
8
Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, (1934)
19 Cornell L. Q. 399, 407 et seq.; see also Blume, The "Common Questions"
Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, (1932) 30 Mich.
L. Rev. 878.
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said that the latter clause creates a second class of cases, founded
on mere numerousness, but the decisions actually require a common
interest of some sort in this situation too.9
The first federal rule on the subject was Equity Rule 48 of
the Rules of 1842, which was quite clearly related to joinder of
parties, since in terms it authorized the court to dispense with
parties in the class suit situation.1 0 A proviso was added to Rule
48, however, stating that in such cases the decree should be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
The intended purpose and scope of this saving clause has been
the subject of some speculation. 1 When the present Federal
Equity Rule 38 was adopted in 1912, this feature of the old
Rule 48 was omitted. Rule 38 provided:
When the question is one of common or general interest to
many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
before the court, one or more may
impracticable to bring them all
2
sue or defend for the whole.'

The Bar Committee of the circuit court of appeals of the second
circuit, upon whose recommendation Rule 38 was promulgated,
advised the omission of the last sentence of the former Rule 48
"for the reason that in every true 'class suit' the decree is neces8
sarily binding upon all parties included in the decree."' The form
of Rule 38 is like that of the state acts.
In general it was recognized that these rules merely stated
formally what was the established equity practice. The plaintiff
should so state his bill that it appears that he is suing on behal f
of a class,1 4 and he should have such an interest that he could
OWheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, (1934)
19 Cornell L. Q. 399, 434; see Pomeroy, Code Remedies, 5th ed., sec. 286.
loThis rule read: "Where the parties on either side are very numerous,
and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the
suit, be all brought before it, the Court in its discretion may dispense with
making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient
parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and
the defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such cases the decree
shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties."
(1842) 1 How. lvi. See 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 723, note 283, 2 Mason's U. S.
Code, tit. 28, sec. 723.
"'See 1 Street, Federal Equity Practice, sec. 550.
12(1912) 226 U. S. appendix p. 11, 33 Sup. Ct. xxix; see 28 U. S. C. A.
sec. 723, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 723.
Federal Equity Rules, 8th ed., 240.
"3Hopkins,
14Hoe v. Wilson, (1870) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 501, 19 L. Ed. 762;
McArthur v. Scott, (1885) 113 U. S. 340, 5 Sup. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed.
1015; Motley v. Southern Ry., (C.C. Ga. 1911) 184 Fed. 956; Ball v.
Bank of Bay Biscayne, (S.D. Fla. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 214. The best
general statement concerning this matter is found in McClelland v. Rose,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1918) 247 Fed. 721, 724, where-the court said:
"In order for a judgment or decree in a suit to be binding upon others
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have joined with them in the prosecution of the suit.15 Care must
be taken that there is a fair representation,"6 and for this purpose
the court may, if necessary, re-align the parties plaintiff and
defendant. 17 Where federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity
of citizenship, only the citizenship of the original parties, not
that of other members of the class, is considered.18 All members
of the class, of course, may come in under the decree and take
advantage of it.19 The filing of the original bill stops the running
of the statute of limitations against all members of the class. 0
Where the suit is successful in establishing or preserving a fund,
costs and attorney's fees are paid from the fund, so that all
members of the class share in the expenses of the successful
plaintiff ;21 and, irrespective of the success of the suit, those who
than those who are brought before the court, it should be made to appear
from the record in the case that such a result is contemplated; that there
are persons not before the court having an interest in common with those
who sue or defend, and why such others are not brought in; and, further,
the relation to the subject-matter of the suit of those who sue or defend
for others as well as themselves should be so disclosed as to present for the
determination of the court the question whether they do or do not properly
represent, not only themselves, but others not before the court, who are
similarly
concerned in the issues they raise or contest."
5

1 Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co, (1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 91,
9 L. 16Ed. 1012.
Smith v. Swormstedt, (1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 288, 14 L. Ed. 942.
' 7 See Irwin v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1927) 19 F. (2d) 300, 303.
18
Stewart v. Dunham, (1885) *115 U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29 L. Ed.
329; Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, (1921) 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup.
Ct. 338, 65 L. Ed. 673; Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co.,
(C.C. Pa. 1891) 46 Fed. 336; Doan v. Consolidated-Progressive Oil Corporation, (D.C. Del. 1920) 271 Fed. 12; McGarry v. Lenz, (S.D. Ohio
1925)9 9 F. (2d) 680.
2 Myers v. Fenn, (1867) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 205, 18 L. Ed. 604; Johnson
v. Waters, (1884) 111 U. S. 640, 4 Sup. Ct. 619, 28 L. Ed. 547; Stewart v.
Dunham, (1885) 115 U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29 L. Ed. 329; In re
Dennett, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1915) 221 Fed. 350. For the form of the decree
in a creditors' bill, see Johnson v. Waters, (1884) 111 U. S. 640, 4 Sup. Ct.
619, 28 L. Ed. 547.
2ORichmond v. Irons, (1887) 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 30 L Ed.
864; Newgass v. Atlantic & D. Ry., (C.C. Va. 1894) 72 Fed. 712; see note
(1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 118, 131.
The same rule applies to laches. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, (1919)
250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533, 63 L. Ed. 1099.
21
Trustees v. Greenough, (1881)
105 U. S. 527, 26 L Ed. 1157
(bondholders); Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, (1885) 113 U. S.
116, 5 Sup. Ct. 387, 28 L. Ed. 915 (creditors) ; Richmond v. Irons, (1887)
121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 30 L. Ed. 864 (creditors) ; Hutchinson Box
Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924) 299 Fed. 424;
Nolte v. Hudson Nay. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 166.
"One jointly interested with others in a common fund who brings and
prosecutes a suit for its preservation and administration, as in a general
creditors' suit, is equitably entitled to reimbursement of his costs, including
reasonable fees of his counsel, to be paid either out of the fund itself or by
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intervene must contribute to the expenses of the action. 22 These
matters have raised no particular difficulties.
Concerning other questions arising in cases under Rule 38,
however, the authorities are not so harmonious. In some cases
where a certain sum must be involved in order to give a federal
court jurisdiction, the courts have held that each plaintiff in a
suit on behalf of the class must have a claim of the requisite
jurisdictional amount; in other representative suits, the courts
have permitted aggregation of the amounts claimed, and some
writers have contended that this should always be done.23 There
have also been divergent holdings in regard to the effect of the
decree, i.e. whether it is conclusive upon all represented or only
on those who are parties to the suit.2 4

While Rule 38 applies

only to equity suits, the similar section in state codes would seem
applicable to actions at law under the Conformity Act. But,
although an analogous procedure has been sanctioned judicially
in cases before the Federal Trade Commission and before the
court of claims, 23 some courts have doubted if the class suit could
proportionate contribution from those receiving the benefit of litigation."
Muskegon Boiler Works v. Tennessee Valley Iron & R. Co., (D.C. Tenn.
1921)22 274 Fed. 836, 837.
1n Edwards v. Bay State Gas Co., (C.C. Dela. 1904) 130 Fed. 242,
a stockholders' derivative suit, the court imposed costs, apportioned per
capita, on the withdrawal of an intervener. The contention of the plaintiff
that costs should be assessed against the intervener in proportion to the
number of shares he held, the resuft if the corporation itself had begun
the suit or if expenses were deducted from the fund recovered, was denied,
the court pointing out that in reality the suit at this stage was that of the
plaintiff and interveners. See note (1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 118, 140.
In Chick v. Northwestern Shoe Co., (C.C. I1. 1895) 118 Fed. 933, 935,
a creditors' bill was brought to recover property alleged to have been fraudulently transferred and to enforce the statutory liability of directors. Two
banks, creditors to the extent of two-thirds of the debt of the corporation,
and who had received the property said to have been fraudulently transferred,
were made defendants. They also filed claims. A motion by the plaintiff
that all creditors contribute an amount equal to five percent of their claims
in order to carry on the litigation, or have their claims stricken out, was
granted. In commenting upon the plight of the defendant banks who were
thus required to pay two-thirds of the costs of suing themselves, the court
said, "the incongruity arises from their own acts in seeking to share in
the proceeds which may be obtained from them upon proof of the alleged
illegal acts with which they are charged." A creditor of course, submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by filing a claim. Alexander v.
Hillman,
(1935) 296 U. S.222, 56 Sup. Ct. 204, 80 L. Ed. 192.
3
2 See Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits, (1931)
15 MINNESOTA LAW RPVIEW 501; Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous
Litigants, (1934) 19 Corn. L. Q. 399, 418, 435.
24
See Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants,
(1934) 19 Corn. L. Q. 399, 427 et seq.; note (1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev.
118, 25132.
Southern Hardware Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 5th
Cir. 1923) 290 Fed. 773; Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commis-
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be utilized in cases at law.26 Finally, there has been some tincertainty as to the amount of control which the original parties
to a class suit could, or ought to, exercise over the proceedings.
The advisory committee evidently had these questions in mind
when it drafted Rule 23 of the proposed Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. That Rule reads in part as follows:
Rule 23. Class Actions.
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, such number of them as will fairly insure the adequate
representation of all may, on behalf of all, join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants, when the character of the right sought to
be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce such right and a
member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication
of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
(c) Dismnissal or Compromise. No class action shall be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court on
such notice
to other members of the class as the court may
27
require.
It will be observed that the rule attempts to define three different
types of class actions, and to limit the amount of control over
the action exercisable by the original parties. In view of the
importance which the distinctions thus drawn have with reference
sion, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 673; United States v. "Old
Settlers," (1893) 148 U. S. 427, 13 Sup. Ct. 650, 37 L. Ed. 509 (Court of
Claims) ; Winton v. Amos, (1921) 255 U. S. 373, 41 Sup. Ct. 342, 65
L. Ed. 684 (Court of Claims).
2
McNary v. Guaranty Trust Co., (N.D. Ohio 1934) 6 F. Supp. 616.
criticized in note (1934) 19 Corn. L. Q. 614; see also Fletcher v. Burt,

(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1903) 126 Fed. 619.
But class suits at law have been maintained in federal courts: Penny v.
Central Coal and Coke Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 138 Fed. 769 (trespass

for injury to freehold of a religious society) ; Stearns Coal & Lumber Co.

v. Van Winkle, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1915) 221 Fed. 590 (ejectment brought

by shareholders of a corporation whose charter had expired) ; see Brusselback v. Cago Corporation, (S.D. N.Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 993 (dismissing
action in equity by bondholders to recover stockholders' liability on ground
the suit should have been at law) ; Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil
Procedure-IL. Pleadings and Parties, (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 1291, 1321.
27
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States (Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure,
April, 1937).
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to the problems posed above, each part of the rule, together with
the decided cases in point, will be considered separately.
II.

CLASSIFICATION OF SUITS

It has long been recognized that the class suit device has been,
and should be, extended to cases other than those to fit whose
peculiar needs it was first developed. Street made a questionable
assimilation of the older cases to proceedings in rem by stating
that the true, as distinguished from the "spurious," class suit
concerns property and not personal liability.2 8

Similar is a state-

ment that the class suit will lie only where there is a limited
fund.2 9 Subsection (a) of proposed Federal Rule 23 attempts to
distinguish the cases on the basis of the character of the rights of
members of the class. A consideration of the principal federal
decisions will disclose the validity of this method of classification.
A. True Class Actions.-Of frequent occurrence are suits by
and against persons as representatives of a voluntary association.
The members of such an association have joint interests in the
association property; they are jointly, or by statute jointly and
severally, liable on contracts made to carry out the objects for
which the organization was formed; and they are jointly and
severally liable for torts committed by the association."0
So
where a few members sue on behalf of all the members, a joint
right is being enforced. A representative number have thus been
permitted to maintain a bill to quiet title to the common property
and enjoin a nuisance, 2 1 and to bring an action of trespass to
recover the value of coal taken from the common lands. 2 ConStreet, Federal Equity Practice, sec. 547.
note (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 564.
See 4 Cyc. 310; Dicey, Parties to Actions, 2d Am. ed., Rules 20,
56, 104; Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions,
(1924)
33 Yale L. J. 383, 384.
31
2Beatty v. Kurtz, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 566, 7 L. Ed. 521 (church).
3 Penny v. Central Coal & Coke Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 138
Fed. 769 (association-church). The action being at law, the suit was based
upon the Arkansas code provision for class actions.
In United States v. "Old Settlers," (1893) 148 U. S. 427, 13 Sup. Ct.
650, 37 L. Ed. 509, a class suit was brought in the court of claims on behalf
of a tribe of Indians to recover money alleged to be due them from the
United States under a treaty.
In International News Service v. Associated Press, (1918) 248 U. S.
215, 39 Sup. Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211, 2 A. L. R. 293, the Associated Press,
an incorporated cooperative association, sued to enjoin the defendant from
inducing members of the association to violate its articles and by-laws,
and from bribing the employees of such members to furnish before publication news items supplied by the Associated Press. In answer to the argument that the lower court granted relief applicable to particular members
281

29
See
30
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versely, class actions have been maintained against representatives
of members of an association to enforce joint tort and contractual
liabilities.3 3 It is true that an unincorporated association has
capacity to sue or be sued in its own name under sonic state
statutes, and that these statutes sometimes may be used in law
actions in federal courts under the Conformity Act.3' The rule in
the Coronado Case 33 accords a like capacity to the association for
the purpose of enforcing for or against it a federal substantive
right. Since an unincorporated association has no citizenship,3"
however, the class suit must still be resorted to where federal
jurisdiction is predicated upon diversity of citizenship.
Creditors frequently are given a right to enforce the statutory
liability of stockholders or directors of a corporation. Where
the right is given to all the creditors, and not to each individual
creditor, and the statute is said to contemplate a fund for the
common benefit, the right may be classed as common. In such
of the Associated Press, the Supreme Court stated that while. except for
their numbers, the members were necessary parties, the plaintiff represented
them under Equity Rule 38. Accord: Associated Press v. KVOS. Inc..
(D.C.3 Wash. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 279.
3Yardley v. Philler, (C.C. Pa. 1893) 58 Fed. 746 (bill brought by a
receiver against the committee of a clearing house association to recover the
proceeds of checks retained by the association and alleged to be a preference); Society of Shakers v. Watson, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1895) 68 Fed. 730
(bill brought against defendants as representatives of a society to subject
the common property to payment of certain notes). See Colt v. Hicks. (1932)
97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N. E. 335 (action by beneficiary of a member of a union
against the union to recover death benefits). In Winton v. Amos. (1921)
255 U. S. 373, 41 Sup. Ct. 342, 65 L. Ed. 684, a congressional act, authorizing a suit in the Court of Claims by the plaintiff against the governor of
the Choctaw Nation, to settle the plaintiff's claim against the Nation for
services rendered in securing citizenship in the Nation for the Mississippi
Choctaws, was said to authorize a class suit similar to that in Equity
Rule 38.
See United States v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n, (C.C. Cal. 1898) 85 Fed.
252 (bill in equity, naming an association and 17 individual members as
defendants, to dissorve the association as an unlawful combination in
restraint of trade); Evenson v. Spaulding. (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1907) 150
Fed. 517 (bill to enjoin a conspiracy in restraint of trade--Old Equity Rule
48 applied).
34See Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-i. Pleadings and Parties, (1935) 44 Yale I J. 1291, 1315-1317.
35United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co.. (1922)
259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762. See Sturges.
Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Action, (1924) 33 Yale L. J.
383. 36The rule of the Coronado case is adopted in Federal Rule 17.
Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, (1904)
195 U. S. 207, 25 Sup. Ct. 24, 49 L. Ed. 160: Russell v. Central Labor
Union, (D.C. Ill. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 412 (suit against labor unions for tortdemurrer on ground that court had no jurisdiction because citizenship of
members not shown, sustained) ; Livering & Garrigues v. Morrin. (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 115, aff'd (1933) 289 U. S. 103. 53 Sup. Ct.
549, 77 L. Ed. 1062.
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cases it has been held that there must be a suit in equity where
all creditors should be joined or a class suit brought.Y Class
actions have been brought in various other situations where the
action may be said to have been brought to enforce a common
right. An action by part of the members of a voluntary association against the entity to secure a division of, or to settle
rights in, the common property, to enjoin the unlawful use of
common funds, or to enforce compliance with the constitution or
articles of the association, would seem to involve the enforcement
of a common right."' Upon the expiration or forfeiture of a
corporation's charter its stockholders become tenants in common
of the property and may, in a representative action, recover the
property and have it apportioned among them. 39
37

Pollard v. Bailey, (1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 520, 22 L. Ed. 376;
Terry v. Little, (1880) 101 U. S. 216, 25 L. Ed. 864; Patterson v. Lynde,
(1883) 106 U. S. 519, 1 Sup. Ct. 432, 27 L. Ed. 265; Alsop v. Conway,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1911) 188 Fed. 568. See United States Smelting Co.
v. Hofkin, (D.C. Pa. 1917) 245 Fed. 896 (class suit by creditors to enforce
statutory liability of directors) ; Brusselback v. Cago Corporation, (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 20 (reversing (D.C. N.Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 993
and allowing a class suit by bondholders to recover stockholders' liability) ;
Brusselback v. Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936)
85 F. (2d) 617.
"The plaintiff under both the general equity practice and Equity Rule
38 (28 U.S.C.A. following section 723) is entitled to maintain this suit
in its own behalf and on behalf of all other creditors of the bank." Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Central Republic Trust Co., (D.C. Ill.
1935) 11 F. Supp. 976 (same corporation as in Brusselback cases, supra).
Under the National Banking Act, the order of the comptroller of the
currency declaring to what extent the individual liability of the stockholders shall be enforced is conclusive, and the receiver sues at law. Casey
v. Galli, (1877) 94 U. S. 673, 24 L. Ed. 168, 307. The New York banking
law is similar. Broderick v. American General Corporation, (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 864.
If the individual creditor is given a separate right to enforce the
liability, a class suit would have to come under subsection (a) (3) of
Rule3823.
See Smith v. Swormstedt, (1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 288, 14 1.. Ed.
942 (plaintiffs, representing 1,500 Southern Methodist preachers, sued the
defendants, representing 3,800 Northern preachers, to secure a division of
the -property of the old association); Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. lbs,
(1915) 237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692, 59 L. Ed. 1165 (class suit brought by
certificate holders- in mutual assessment insurance association to determine
rights in a mortuary fund) ; Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, (1921)
255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338, 65 L. Ed. 673 (persons representing a class of
members in a fraternal benefit society attack a reorganization plan) ; lIehi
v. Zarecor, (D.C. Tenn. 1913) 213 Fed. 648 (like Smith v. Swormstedt,
(1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 288, 14 L. Ed. 942); Sharpe v. Bonham, (D.C.
Tenn. 1913) 213 Fed. 660 (same as previous case) ; Local No. 7 of Bricklayers', etc., Union v. Bowen, (D.C. Tex. 1922) 278 Fed. 271 (bill by some
members of local union against the national union to restrain action violating
the constitution of the Union) ; Irwin v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 300 (bill by one. class of members in
reciprocal
insurance association against other members).
39
Bacon v. Rpbertson, (1856) 18 How. (U.S.) 480, 15 L. Ed. 499
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"Secondary" rights referred to in the rule include those which
normally are called derivative. Common among these are suits
by some of the stockholders of a corporation, on behalf of all
stockholders, against the corporation and its directors. The primary right belongs to the corporation, and the stockholders derive
their right to enforce it because the corporation, controlled by the
board of directors, neglects or refuses to do so.40 All stockholders,
of course, have an interest. Such actions may be brought to set
aside illegal, ultra vires, or fraudulent contracts, to restrain the
misapplication of corporate funds, and to secure the return of
property wrongfully transferred. 1 Of like nature are class
actions by members against the officers of a voluntary association
to recover money wrongfully taken. 1- Taxpayers' actions to
challenge illegal municipal acts also proceed upon this theory.
The action may be to enjoin ultra vires acts of the city, to compel
repayment to the municipal corporation of sums illegally paid
out by its officers, or to enforce any other cause of action belonging to the municipality where its officers wrongfully refuse to
act.'" If the purpose of the action is thus to vindicate a public, as
(charter forfeited-suit against trustee who had funds remaining after all
debts paid); Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 40
1915) 221 Fed. 590 (ejectment-used state class action statute).
See Ballantine, Corporation Law, secs. 186 et seq. Sonetimes it
is said that these suits have two phases, one to compel the corporation
to sue, the other the suit by the corporation asserted by the stockholders.
See Cantor v. Sachs, (1932) 18 Del. Ch. 359, 365, 162 At. 73. 76.
4"Davenport v. Dows, (1874) 18 Wall. (U.S.) 626, 21 L. Ed. 938 (to
enjoin payment of illegal tax); Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, (1919)
250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533, 63 L. Ed. 1099 (to set aside fraudulent
conveyance of assets to majority stockholders) ; Thouron v. East Tennessee.
V. & G. Ry., (C.C. Tenn. 1889) 38 Fed. 673 (to enjoin ultra vires act);
Hill v. Glasgow R. Co., (C.C. Ky. 1888) 41 Fed. 610 (to restrain misapplication of corporate funds); Larabee v. Dolley, (C.C. Kan. 1909) 175
Fed. 365; Backus v. Brooks, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1912) 195 Fed. 452; Carpenter
v. Knollwood Cemetery, (D.C. Mass. 1912) 198 Fed. 297; Dana v.Morgan.
(D.C. N.Y. 1914) 219 Fed. 313 (to set aside fraudulent contract) ; In re
Dennett, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1915) 221 Fed. 350 (to recover property wrongly
transferred); Bogert v. Southern Pacific Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1923) 290
Fed. 727; Hutchinson Box Board & Paper Co. v.Van Horn, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1924) 299 Fed. 424; Luster v.Martin, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1932) 58 F.
(2d) 537.
The corporation should be made a defendant: Davenport v. Dows.
(1874) 18 Wall. (U.S.) 626, 21 L. Ed. 938. See note (1934) 43 Yale L. J.
661. The plaintiff, of course, must be a stockholder: \Vhitaker v.Whitaker
Iron Co., (D.C. W. Va. 1916) 238 Fed. 980.
The present Equity Rule 27, relating to the necessary avermients in a
bill brought by a stockholder or shareholder, is carried over into Federal
Rule 223(b) with slight change.
4 See Haynes v. Fraternal Aid Union, (D.C. Kan. 1929) 34 F. (2d)

~305.

'43Brown v. Trousdale, (1891) 138 U. S.389, 11 Sup. Ct. 308. 34 L. Ed.
987 (to restrain assessment and collection of taxes to pay invalid bond
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distinguishable from a private, right, it should be brought as a
class action. 44 Actions by creditors to enforce the payment of
unpaid stock subscriptions likewise probably are founded on a
4
secondary right, the primary right belonging to the corporation. 1
46
The action must be brought for the benefit of all creditors.
Where representative suits by secured bondholders are classified depends largely upon the terms of the trust indenture with
which the bonds are issued. If the mortgage is made directly to
the bondholders, their right to foreclose would seem to be joint
or common. 4 7 But ordinarily the mortgage runs in favor of a
trustee, who has the primary duty to protect the security, and
he represents the holders of bonds thereby secured. 4" On the
failure or inability of the trustee to perform his duty, some of the
bondholders may sue on behalf of all to secure a foreclosure."'
McIntosh v.
issue, and to enjoin holders from collecting on the bonds)
Pittsburgh, (C.C. Pa. 1901) 112 Fed. 705 (see infra. note 60) ; Rislcy
v. City of Utica, (C.C. N.Y. 1909) 173 Fed. 502 (to restrain collection
of tax to pay to a water company under an allegedly invalid contract) ; 22
Cyc. 897; 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 1588; 6 McQuillin.
Municipal Corporations, sec. 2740 et seq.; note (1933) 33 Colum. L. Rev.
1014.
"Of t'he right of resident taxpayers to invoke the interposition of a court
of equity to prevent an illegal disposition of the moneys of the count%
or the illegal creation of a debt which they in common with other property
holders of the county may otherwise be compelled to pay. there is at this
day no serious question." Crampton v. Zabriskie. (1880) 101 U. S. 601.
609, 25 L. Ed. 1070.
446 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 2748.
4
5See Ballantine, Corporation Law, sec. 199.
16George W. Signor Tie Co. v. Monett & S. \V. Const. Co., (D.C
Mo. 1912) 198 Fed. 412; John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Kinnicutt.
(D.C. N.Y. 1917) 248 Fed. 596. Creditors may file a bill to force the
%
corporation -to levy an assessment for the unpaid balance. Handlc
Stutz, (1891) 139 U. S. 417, 11 Sup. Ct. 530, 35 L. Ed. 227. If h, receiver
or a trustee in bankruptcy is appointed for the corporation, lie has the
sole right to sue to collect unpaid subscriptions. Reagan v. Midland Packing Co., (D.C. Ia. 1924) 298 Fed. 500. See Hawkins v. Glenn, (1889)
131 U. S. 319, 9 Sup. Ct. 739, 33 L.. Ed. 184.
47
See Railroad Co. v. Orr. (1874) 18 Wall. (U.S.) 471. 21 I.. Id
810 (15 not numerous so all should have joined).
4
SBeals v. Illinois, M. & T. R. Co., (1890) 133 U. S. 290, 10 Sup. Ct
314, 33 L. Ed. 608; Bullard v. City of Cisco, Tex., (1933) 290 Li. S
179, 54 Sup. Ct. 177, 78 L. Ed. 254: Guaranty Trust Co. v. Minneapolis
& St. L. R., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 418: Campbell v. Railroad Co., (C.C. Tex. 1871) 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2366. See Rodgers, Rights
and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reorganizations, (1929)
42 Harv. L. Rev. 899, 903.
40Galveston R. Co. v. Cowdrey. (1871)
11 Wall. (U.S.) 459, 20
L. Ed. 199 (trustee dead) : Toler v. Fast Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., (D.C.
Tenn. 1894) 67 Fed. 168 (trustee refused to foreclose) : Wilmer v. Atlanta
& R. Air Line Ry., (C.C. Ga. 1875) 30 Fed. Cas. No. 17,776. See Dewing.
Financial Policy of Corporations 3d ed.. 80; 1 Quindry, Bonds and Bondholders, sees. 72, 88, 96, 227.
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Similarly, they may bring a class suit to secure the appointment
of a successor trustee,"0 and, where their protective committee
has bought in the property on foreclosure and fraudulently
issued bonds, a bondholders' representative suit to cancel the
fraudulent bonds may be maintained. 1 A suit by cestuis on
behalf of themselves and all other beneficiaries under a trust
deed, against the trustee and the heirs of the settlor, to quiet title
to the trust property, the trustee having refused to bring the suit,
also would seem to involve the enforcement of a secondary right."
Finally, some of the distributees of an estate may bring a class
suit against an executor or an administrator to obtain distribution
of property or to construe a will?
Conversely, an action may
be brought against some heirs as representing all."
In general these are the cases for which the equity doctrine
as to class suits was first developed, namely, as Dean Clark has
correctly pointed out,5 ': cases where joinder otherwise would be
compulsory. They are not limited necessarily to cases involving
property, the test suggested by Street." For purposes of the class
action, it is immaterial whether the right sought to be enforced
by or against the class is joint or common, but the use of "'joint"
does serve to discredit the erroneous idea, advanced by the \Vis5
OAcken v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 9
F. Supp. 521.
5
Cowell v. City Water Supply Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1903) 121
Fed. 53. See Trustees v. Greenough, (1881) 105 U. S. 527. 26 L. Ed.
1157 (similar suit against trustee).
5
"Bowdoin College v. Merritt, (C.C. Cal. 1893) 54 Fed. 55. See
Carnahan v. Peabody, (D.C. N.Y. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 311 aff'd (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1930) 36 F. (2d) 1019 (suit by cestuis to enforce the trust and for an
accounting).
53See Payne v. Hook. (1869) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 425. 19 L. Ed. 261)
(against public administrator to obtain distribution); McArthur v. Scott.
(1885) 113 U. S. 340, 5 Sup. Ct. 652. 28 L. Ed. 1015; McClelland v. Rose.
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1918) 247 Fed. 721 (to construe will). In lloc V.
Wilson, (1870) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 501, 19 L. Ed. 762. a suit by heirs to
set aside a sale of deceased's realty on a bill filed by a creditor, it was
held that all heirs must join, there being only thirteen of them.
As to when the executor represents other heirs and legatees in a suit
by one to construe a will, see Stevens v. Smith. (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1903) 126
Fed. 706; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1916) 230 Fed. 781.
54
Alger v. Anderson, (C.C. Tenn. 1897) 78 Fed. 729 (suit by purchaser
against some heirs at law of vendor).
5
3Clark, Code Pleading, sec. 63. Some criticism has been made of
his statement. See Blume, the "Common Questions" Principle in the
Code Provision for Representative Suits, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 878,
897-898; note (1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 118, 119, n. 4. This criticism is
due in part to 'a failure to recognize the distinctions between the effects
of the decree in various classes of cases.
• 6Street, Federal Equity Practice. sec. 547.
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consin court,5" that the class suit exception does not apply to
persons who are united in interest.
Just as it is true that justice might never be done if it were
necessary to join all parties with interests in the subject-matter
or the object of a suit, it also is true that even when a class
action is permitted in such situations, the decree may be ineffective
unless absent persons can be bound by it. If those persons are
members of a class and have a right or other legal relation in
common or jointly with actual parties who must necessarily set
up the same claim or defense as the absent parties would, there
are practical reasons for saying that the court should make its
decree effective and not have to re-try the case at a later (late.
Where the members of a class have a secondary right, the owner
of the primary right could enforce it for the benefit of the class,
thereby precluding themi, 5 and there is no reason why some member of the class should not fill the same representative role. In
an early case in which the plaintiff had established a right against
a clas of which the plaintiff was a member, the lord chancellor
.aid. "If the Defendant should not be found. suits of this nature
...would be infinite and impossible to be ended." 5 9 Therefore, the
decree i all true class actions, representation being adequate and
there being no fraud or collusion, is conclusive upon the classres judicata. 0
57See George v. Benjamin, (1898) 100 Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619, cited
favorably in 30 Cyc. 134.
5sStockholders are thus bound by a judgment rendered in a suit
by or against the corporation. The same is true where a trustee represents
cestuis. See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, (1926) 270 U. S. 611,
46 Sup.
Ct. 420, 70 L. Ed. 757.
•'90Brown v. Vermuden, (1676) 1 Cas. M. Ch. 272.
G Smith v. Swormstedt, (1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 288, 14 L. Id.
942 (members of a voluntary association); Supreme Council of Royal
Arcanum v. Green, (1915) 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed.
1089 (certificate holders' suit to determine rights in mortuary fund under
mutual assessment plan insurance-prior suit in state court held conclusive) :
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, (1921) 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct.
338, 65 L. Ed. 673 (common right-similar to previous case) ; McIntosh v.
Pittsburgh, (C.C. Pa. 1901) 112 Fed. 705 (taxpayers-prior decree held
binding on the class); Dana v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 1914) 219 Fed. 313
stockholders' bill - secondary right - dismissed on ground decree in
previous suit by another stockholder was res judicata) ; McClelland v. Rose,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1918) 247 Fed. 721 (suit by heirs-suits by other heirs
after decree in class suit enjoined) ; see Seminole Securities Co. v. Southern
Life Ins. Co.. (C.C. N.C. 1910) 182 Fed. 85. In Wallace v. Adams, (1907)
204 U. S. 415. 27 Sup: Ct. 363, 51 L. Ed. 547. it was held that Congress had
provided for such a result in the particular case. See 1 Freeman, Judgments, 5th ed., secs. 436 et seq.
In McArthur v. Scott. (1885) 113 U. S. 340. 5 Sup. Ct. 652, 28 L.
Ed. 1015, the court pointed out that Old Equity Rule 48 saved the rights
of absent parties, but Smith v. Swormstedt. (1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 288,
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Where a certain amount must be' in controversy in order to
support either the jurisdiction of the federal court or the right
of appeal, the amount in a true class action is that of the claim
sought to be enforced for or against the class." In other words,
14 L. Ed. 942 properly disregarded the saving clause in a true class suit.
See also a dictum in Coann v. Atlanta Cotton Factory Co., (C.C. Ga. 1882)
14 Fed. 4, that Old Equity Rule 48 saved the rights of absent parties.
The decree may be impeached by absent members of the class if there
was fraud. Campbell v. Railroad Co., (C.C. Tex. 1871) 4 Fed. Cas.
No. 2366.
Pomeroy's statement in his Code Remedies. 5th ed., sec. 297, that the
decree is not binding on those who do not come in formally unless they
have notice and an opportunity to become parties, is erroneous. It is
criticized in Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants,
(1934) 19 Cornell L. Q. 399, 428.
"A fair test of the right to maintain a class suit is whether a decree
would be binding on absent persons said to be members of the class. In
a true class suit the decree is binding on such persons." Bickford's v.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (D.C. N.Y. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 875
(the61court denied that there could be any but true class suits).
Suits by creditors to enforce the common right to collect stockholders' liability: Alsop v. Conway, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1911) 188 Fed.
568; Brusselback v. Cago Corporation, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d)
20; Brusselback v. Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank, (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1936) 85 F. (2d) 617; Reconstruction Finance Corporation V. Central
Republic Trust Co., (D.C. Ill. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 976. Suits by creditors
to recover unpaid stock subscriptions: Handley v. Stutz, (1890) 137 U. S.
366, 11 Sup. Ct. 117, 34 L. Ed. 706; Putnam v. Timothy Dry-Goods &
Carpet Co., (C.C. Tenn. 1897) 79 Fed. 454; Reagan v. Midland Packing
Co., (D.C. Iowa 1924) 298 Fed. 500. In these cases the courts often
say that the amount in controversy is the "fund" or "trust fund" to be
administered.
Suit by members of a reciprocal insurance association to enforce a
common right: Irwin v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 300.
Suits by stockholders to enforce a secondary right: Hill v. Glasgow
R. Co., (C.C. Ky. 1888) 41 Fed. 610 (value of corporation's right);
Larabee v. Dolley, (C.C. Kan. 1909) 175 Fed. 365; Carpenter v. Knollwood Cemetery, (D.C. Mass. 1912) 198 Fed. 297 (value of aggregate
interests of whole class) ; Hutchinson Box Board Paper Co. v. Van Horn.
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924) 299 Fed. 424.
Suit by bondholders to enforce a secondary right: New Orleans
Pacific Railway v. Parker, (1892) 143 U. S. 42, 12 Sup. Ct. 364, 30 L.
Ed. 66 (appeal). Cf. Cowell v. City Water Supply Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1903) 121 Fed. 53, which is distinguishable oin the ground mentioned in the
concurring opinion, namely, that plaintiff asked for a judgment for himself so that the suit was not really a class suit.
In a taxpayers' suit to enforce a secondary right, seeking an injunction against collection by holders of bonds illegally issued and against
levying taxes to pay them, the amount in controversy was held to be the
value of the bonds-the value of the primary right. Brown v. Trousdale.
(1891) 138 U. S. 389, 11 Sup. Ct. 308, 34 L. Ed. 987. If the purpose of the
suit is merely to vindicate a personal, and not a public right, a class suit
brought by a taxpayer falls under subsection (a) (3) of Federal Rule 23,
and each party must have a claim equal to the jurisdictional amount. See
Russell v. Stansell, (1881) 105 U. S. 303, 26 L. Ed. 989; Ogden City v.
Armstrong, (1897) 168 U. S. 224, 18 Sup. Ct. 98, 42 L. Ed. 444; Rogers v.
Hennepin County, (1916) 239 U. S. 621, 36 Sup. Ct. 217, 60 L. Ed. 469.
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the amount in controversy is the value of the aggregate interests
of the whole class. If the suit is to enforce a secondary right,
it often is said that the amount is the value of the primary
right, but this is the same thing, since the primary right is held
for the benefit of the whole class.
B. Hybrid Class Actions.-Subsection (a) (3) of Federal
Rule 23 provides for what have been called hybrid class actions."
An example is a bill by a creditor on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated to throw a corporation into receivership
and to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.6 3 These cases formed the
first and most important extension of the class suit procedure.
Each creditor's claim is several, for he ordinarily could sue alone. 4
but the purpose of the class suit is to secure an equitable distribution of the assets to all creditors entitled thereto. With some
exceptions, the bill must be filed by judgment creditors ;05 creditors
who are not parties must be given an opportunity to come in and
These cases apparently were misconstrued in Elliott v. Board of Trustees,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 845.
The general statement on jurisdictional amount is that "when several
plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common
and undivided interest, it is enough if their interests collectively equal the
jurisdictional amount." Pinel v. Pinel, (1916) 240 U. S. 594, 596, 36 Sup.
Ct. 416, 417, 60 L. Ed. 817. Accord: Shields v. Thomas, (1854) 17 How.
(U.S.) 3, 15 L. Ed. 93; Clay v. Field, (1891) 138 U. S.464, I1 Sup. Ct.
419, 34 L. Ed. 1044.
3
'1 -See

Moore. Federal

Rules

of Civil

Procedure:

Some Problems

Raised by the Preliminary Draft, (1937) 25 Geo. L. J. 551, 574.
c,3See Richmond v. Irons, (1887) 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 30
L. Ed. 864; Central R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus. (1885) 113 U. S. 116.
5 Sup. Ct. 387, 28 L. Ed. 915; Stewart v. Dunham, (1885) 115 U. S.61,
5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29 L. Ed. 329; Gibson v. Shufeldt, (1887) 122 U. S. 27.
7 Sup. Ct. 1066, 30 L. Ed. 1083: State of Maine Lumber Co. v.
Kingfield Co., (D.C. Conn. 1914) 218 Fed. 902.
'64 Ball v. Bank of Bay Biscayne. (D.C. Fla. 1930)

43 F. (2d)

214.

Cf. Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., (C.C. Dela. 1903) 123 Fed. 506 where,
by statute, one creditor could not sue alone. If one creditor brings a
bill in equity to reach equitable assets for himself, he is seeking a priority.
See Hanna, Cases on Creditors' Rights 48, n. 7.
",'It
has been said that only judgment creditors may share in the
fruits of the suit: George v. St. Louis Cable & W. Ry., (C.C. Mo. 1890)
44 Fed. 117, and that creditors coming in under the decree must have
been creditors at the time of the filing of the bill: Richmond v. Irons,
(1887) 121 U. S.27. 7 Sup. Ct. 788. It seems, however, that all creditors
-including unsecured, those without judgments, and subsequent creditorsmay come in under the decree, but equity respects the priorities of the
various classes. See Atlas Ry. Supply Co. v. Lake & River Ry. Co., (C.C.
Ohio 1905) 134 Fed. 503: American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 512, aff'd
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 1002. In some states a creditors' bill
can be brought by creditors without judgments. See Fink v. Patterson,
(C.C. Va. 1884) 21 Fed. 602.
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prove their claims. 60 After the opportunity to file claims has been
afforded, the court may give a final decree settling the rights of
the various claimants in the fund collected by the receiver.
The final decree determines all rights in the fund. It is
conclusive as to actual parties, those who come in under the
decree, and as to all rights in the fund."; As to creditors who
do not come in, however, the decree is res judicata only to the
extent that it affects the funds; it is not res judicata as to the
amount and validity of their claims. But persons who do not
come in usually lose their claims, for there ordinarily is no other
property available out of which to satisfy them. The creditor
who files the bill, and each creditor joining with him as an
original party, must have a claim of the requisite jurisdictional
amount, 6 and there must be diversity of citizenship between such
persons and the defendant. Only the claims and citizenship"' of
the actual parties, however, are looked to in order to determine
jurisdiction. Persons coming in under the decree and filing claims
are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, but they are not
technically parties.
A similar situation probably arises where many persons have
6

U See Myers v. Fenn, (1867)
5 Wall. (U.S.) 205, 18 L. Ed. 604;
Johnson v. Waters, (1884) 111 U. S. 640, 4 Sup. Ct. 619, 28 L. Ed. 547.
The form of the decree in such cases is set out in the latter case.
In Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Astoria Mahogany Co.,
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 945, it was held that a claim presented
over a year after the time fixed for filing claims in the interlocutory
decree should be accepted, where there was no prejudice arising from the
delay. 7
6 Kerrison v. Stewart, (1876) 93 U. S. 155, 23 L. Ed. 843 (no
priority in fund through deed of trust declared fraudulent); Leadville
Coal Co. v. McCreery, (1891) 141 U. S. 475, 12 Sup. Ct. 28, 35 L. Ed.
824 (creditor who has notice and fails to file claim before final judgment
can assert no rights in proceeds of sale of debtor's assets) ; Throckmorton
v. Hickman, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1922) 279 Fed. 196; Phipps v. Chicago, R. 1. &
P. Ry., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 945; In re Dayton Coal & Iron Co.,
(D.C. Tenn. 1922) 291 Fed. 390; Towle v. Donnell, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1931)
49 F. (2d) 49. Accord: Story, Equity Pleadings, 10th ed., sec. 99; see
Arnold and James, Cases on Trials, Judgments and Appeals 175, 176.
No funds should be set aside for creditors who do not present claims.
Richmond v. Irons, (1887) 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 30 L Ed. 864.
68
Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, (1923) 262 U. S. 77, 43 Sup.
Ct. 480, 67 L. Ed. 871; Smithson v. Hubbell, (C.C. Wash. 1897) 81 Fed.
593; Planta v. H. M. Reich Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 888.
Cf. Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., (C.C. Dela. 1903) 123 Fed. 506, 514, where
the Delaware-statute required the suit to be for the benefit of all creditors.
The same is true as to the amount involved in determining the right
to appeal: Stewart v. Dunham, (1885) 115 U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29
L. Ed. 329; Gibson v. Shufeldt, (1887) 122 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 1066,
30 L.69 Ed. 1083.
Stewart v. Dunham, (1885) 115 U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29
L. Ed. 329.
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been defrauded, as by a fake brokerage business,70 on different
contracts, and a class suit is brought by one of the defrauded
persons against the defrauder to enjoin the paying out of moneys
so received, to appoint a receiver, and for an accounting. In so far
as the "trust fund" is concerned, the effect of the decree and the
jurisdictional requirements should be the same as in creditors'
actions. The converse case might be one in which a stakeholder,
holding property subject to many claims, puts it in the custody
of the court and names representatives of the class as defendants.7
C. Spurious Class Actions.-In the third type of actions, provided for by subsection (a) (3) of Rule 23, the only community
of interest is in questions of law or fact. Class actions are not
permitted in such situations either in England"' or in New York."
Liberal rules of joinder in those jurisdictions, securing reduction
of counsel fees, duplication of proof and reduction in the number
of suits, make these actions unnecessary. Writers who have
thought otherwise were thinking of further curtailment of litigation in terms of a class action wherein the decree is conclusive. 4
They overlook factors, such as that various defenses (estoppel,
set-off, contributory negligence, etc.) may exist against some complainants and not against others, which indicate that parties whose
rights are separable should not be concluded from asserting those
rights by a judgment rendered in an action to which they were
not parties.
The use of the class suit device in such cases, however, may
be justified in the federal courts. For, where each plaintiff has
a separate right, each must have a claim of $3,000, and there
must be diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all
defendants. And probably each person who attempts to intervene, there being no absolute right to intervene, must have an
7Cook v. Flagg, (D.C. N.Y. 1915) 255 Fed. 195.
7lSee Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems
Raised by the Preliminary Draft, (1937) 25 Geo. L. J. 551.
72
Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co. [1910] 2 K. B. 1021. It is
said that a class action will not lie where the relief sought is damages.
See also Barrett v. Harris, (1921) 21 Ont. W. N. 293, noted (1922)
36 Harv.
L. Rev. 89.
73
Bouten v. Van Buren, (1920) 229 N. Y. 17, 127 N. E. 477; see Cherry
v. Howell, (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 4 F. Supp. 597, noted (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev.
564. Cf. Atkins v. Trowbridge, (1914) 162 App. Div. 629, 148 N. Y. S.
181.
74
1 See Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision
for Representative Suits, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 878; Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants (1934) 19 Cornell L. Q.
399, n. 1.
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independent ground of federal jurisdiction.' This means that if
numerous persons have a cause of action against one defendant
and there is a common question of law or fact involved, some will
be able to sue in the federal courts, while others will have to
sue in state courts. Yet, because the parties are numerous, it
would seem desirable to avoid a multiplicity of suits and resolve
a litigious situation by allowing all to assert their rights in one
action. If a class action can be brought, this can be accomplished,
since in those actions only the original parties need have the
jurisdictional requisites; the intervener's citizenship or the amount
of his claim is immaterial. 6 The defendant can hardly object to
this procedure; there is no injury to him. Nor do the members
of the class have anything to lose if the decree is not conclusive
upon members who do not come in; the class action does not then
affect substantive rights as it does in the true class action; it is
merely a procedural device.
As a matter of fact, class actions have been permitted by the
federal courts in cases where the rights are several and the
community of interest is only in the law or facts.77 For example,
such a suit, on behalf of all merchants and jobbers in certain
cities, has been maintained against the Interstate Commerce Commission to restrain it from enforcing a rate order providing higher
freight rates to those cities than to other cities.
The rights of
each shipper would appear to be several. In Ayres v. Car-ar,"'
the plaintiff, claiming equitable title to a tract of land, brought a
75Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hosier, (1925) 267 U. S. 276, 45 Sup. Ct.
261, 69 L. Ed. 609; Cochrane v. X. F. Potts Son & Co., (C.C.A. 5th
Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 1026. See Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention
-The Right To Intervene and Reorganization, (1936) 45 Y~ale L J. 565,

582.

"Stewart v. Dunham, (1885)

115 U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29 L Ed.

329; Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, (1921)

255 U. S. 356, 41

Sup. Ct. 338, 65 L. Ed. 673; Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel

Co., 7(CC.
Pa. 1891) 46 Fed. 336.
7
See-_0te (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 624. Story approved of such
actions. See his dictum in West v. Randall, (C.C. R.I. 182.0) 29 Fed.
Cas. No. 17,424, and Story, Equity Pleading, 10th ed., sec. 97; see also I
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 269.
7
BMerchants' & Manufacturers' Traffic Ass'n of Sacramento v. United

States, (D.C. Cal. 1915) 231 Fed. 292.
79(1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 591, 15 L. Ed. 179. See Prentice v. Duluth
Storage & Forwarding Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 58 Fed. 437 (class
action by landowners to quiet title against defendant) ; Thompson v. Emmett
Irr. Dist., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1915) 227 Fed. 560 (class action by bondholders to quiet title); Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall,
(D.C. Fla. 1922) 283 Fed. 150. See also Osborne v. Wis. Cen. R. It.
(C.C. Wis. 1890) 43 Fed. 824, 827 (not a class suit); Chaffee, Bills of
Peace With Multiple Parties, (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1297, 1317 et seq.
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bill against some two hundred persons who had severally bought
with notice parcels of it since his right accrued, praying that
their conveyances be set aside as in fraud of his rights. The
trial court named seven persons to defend and represent the
others. On appeal, the Supreme Court, not denying that the
procedure was proper, stated that the decree in such a case would
not determine the rights of absent parties, their rights being
separate and independent. In Chew v. First Presbytbrian Church,"
owners of lots in a cemetery were permitted to bring a bill in
behalf of themselves and other lot owners to restrain threatened
destruction and removal of tombs and vaults. Other cases of
this type where the action has been recognized are a suit by some
shareholders on behalf of all to compel a corporation to issue
new shares, in accordance with an offer to them of "rights" to
subscribe,"' and a suit by some telephone subscribers on behalf
of all to compel the company to perform the several contracts by
preventing interruptions in the service.8"
The courts frequently have allowed one taxpayer to bring a
bill on behalf of himself and all others similarly interested to
83
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might very well be put in this category,
question of law, but the right to bring a class action for that
purpose has been denied.85
Class actions in behalf of numerous persons allegedly defrauded
by the same or similar acts of the defendant have been both per80(D.C. Dela. 1916) 237 Fed. 219.
8lCohn v. Cities Service Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 687.
S2Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., (D.C. Ohio 1917) 240 Fed.
759.
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Little v. Tanner, (D.C. Wash. 1913) 208 Fed. 605; Nolen v. Riechman, (D.C. Tenn. 1915) 225 Fed. 812; Gramling v. Maxwell, (D.C. N.C.
1931) 52 F. (2d) 256; note (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 624. In State of Ohio v.
Cox, (D.C. Ohio 1919) 257 Fed. 334, the taxpayer sued to enjoin the
governor of Ohio from transmitting the prohibition amendment to the
general assembly, and the court said in a dictum that a class suit would
since the taxpayers' rights were several.
not lie,
8
4See supra p. 15. Elliott v. Board of Trustees, (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1931) 53 F. (2d) 845 probably was a true class suit, but the court (lid
so; it confused the case with other suits by taxpayers.
not think
85
See Scott v. Donald. (1897) 165 U. S. 107, 17 Sup. Ct. 262, 41
L. Ed. 648; Baker v. Portland, (C.C. Or. 1879) 2 Fed. Cas. No. 777:
Raich v. Truax, (D.C. Ariz. 1915) 219 Fed. 273.
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mitted and denied. In Ayer v. Kernper,b the bill was framed in
equity against a former receiver to hold him as constructive
trustee of profits made from the purchase of notes, alleged to have
been secured by fraudulent representations and suppression of
material facts while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The court
recognized that the suit was a "'spurious" class suit. But in
Cherry v. Howell,8 where the action was brought at law by two
bondholders who, with numerous others, were defrauded by a
false prospectus, a class action was denied because, by virtue of
the Conformity Act, the action was brought under the New York
statute, and New York does not recognize the spurious class action.
Under the Federal Rules, of course, the state acts will not apply;
it will make no difference that the action was formerly cognizable
at law.
The classification of class actions against unions to enjoin
threatened acts of violence, with the usual blanket labor injunctions,
may seem problematical.ss It usually is stated that one who is
not an actual party to an injunction cannot be held for its violation.1
This question, however, seldom arises. For one reason, the plaintiff may always bring in other parties by supplemental process.00
Again, the court always has power to punish for contempt one
who interferes with its order, as by doing the acts restrained by
the order, or by aiding others to do so, when he has knowledge
thereof.9' Ordinarily all members of the class are thus forced to
s6(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 11. Cf. Associated Almond
Growers of Paso Robles v. Wymond, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 1.
87(D.C. N.Y. 1931) 4 F. Supp. 597, approved in note (1934) 20
Va. L. Rev. 564. See also Bickford's v. F'.'deral Reserve Bank of New
York, (D.C. N.Y. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 875.
88
For such cases, see Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, (1917)
245 U. S.229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260 (court indicates injunction
not binding on members of the class not served with process) ; Oxley Stave
Co. v. Coopers' International Union of North America, (C.C. Kan. 1896)
72 Fed. 695; American Steel and Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' Unions, (C.C.
Ohio 1898) 90 Fed. 598; A. R. Barnes v. Berry, (C.C. Ohio 1907) 156
Fed. 72; Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co. v. Montana Federation of
Labor, (C.C. Mont. 1907) 156 Fed. 809; Hill v. Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co.,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1915) 219 Fed. 719.
S9In re Reese, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1901) 107 Fed. 942, 945; Wellesley
v. Mornington, (1848) 11 Beav. 180; 2 High, Injunctions, 4th ed., sec.
1435.
9OAmerican Steel and Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' Unions, (C.C.
Ohio 1898) 90 Fed. 598, 605.
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See Bessette v. W. B. Conkey & Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 24
Sup. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997; Ex parte Lennon, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1894)
64 Fed. 320 and cases cited; In re Reese, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1901) 107
Fed. 942, 945; Wellesley v. Mornington, (1848) 11 Beav. 180, 181; 22
Cyc. 1012; Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction 86, 87, 123

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

obey the court order, the plainitff taking care to see that all have
notice, and therefore it is not necessary to classify such actions.
The decree in the spurious class action should be binding only
upon the original parties, those who intervene, and their privies;
it has been so held." Each original plaintiff,93 but not each
intervener, 4 must have an independent ground for federal jurisdiction. As it has been stated with regard to the amount in
controversy: "Separate plaintiffs are allowed to pool their separate
demands in order to total the jurisdictional amount only when
they join to enforce a single title or right in which they have a
common or undivided interest, not distinct interests. Where the

joinder is not grounded upon such common right, but is merely
one for convenience, the demand of each must amount to the
jurisdictional minimum.

' 9

5

One possible technical objection to the wording of Rule 23
may be made at this point. It will be observed that the rule makes
the classification of a particular class action depend upon the
"character of the right or rights sought to be enforced for or
against the class." Suppose that an unincorporated association
operates a freight ship.

The vessel carries contraband of war in

et seq.; 2 High, Injunctions, 4th ed., sec. 1415; note (1921) 15 A. L. R.
387.
See also St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McKnight, (1917) 244 U. S.
368, 37 Sup. Ct. 611, 61 L. Ed. 1200 and Wabash Ry. Co. v. Koenig,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1921) 274 Fed. 909 (suits by railroad company against state
officers and some shippers to test validity of a rate order and to enjoin
all shippers from suing for damages for failure of the railroad to follow
set), which seem to involve the same principle.
the rate
92
Ayres v. Carver, (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 591, 594, 15 L. Ed. 179;
Aver v. Kemper, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 11, 14 (original
plaintiff and six interveners had secured a dismissal "with prejudice" and
persons trying to intervene later argued that this would bar a suit by
them). In the latter case, the court said: "But properly speaking, Ayer's
suit was not a class suit. There is not a single interest held by all the
former noteholders. . . . Ayer's suit was a 'spurious' class suit; and the
decree does not bind those who are not parties." See also Wabash R. Co. v.
Adelbert College, (1908) 208 U. S.38, 28 Sup. Ct. 182, 52 L. Ed. 379 and
Compton v. Jesup, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1895) 68 Fed. 263 (suits by unsecured
bondholders to establish a lien).
93
Russell v. Stansell, (1881) 105 U. S.303, 26 L. Ed. 989 (amount on
appeal) ; Colvin v. City of Jacksonville, (1895) 158 U. S.456, 15 Sup. Ct.
866, 39 L. Ed. 1053; Ogden City v. Armstrong, (1897) 168 U. S. 224.
18 Sup. Ct. 98, 42 L. Ed. 444; Rogers v. Hennepin County, (1916) 239
U. S. 621, 36 Sup. Ct. 217, 60 L. Ed. 469; Scott v. Frazier. (1920)
253 U. S. 243, 40 Sup. Ct. 503, 60 L. Ed. 469; Orleans-Kenner Co. v.
Dunbar, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1915) 218 Fed. 344; Everglades Drainage
League v. Napoleon B. Broward Drainage Dist., (D.C. Fla. 1918) 253
Fed. 246.
94
Supra note 76.
95Dewar v. Brooks, (D.C. Nev. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 636.
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violation of contracts with shippers and, with its cargo, is destroyed by one of the warring parties for that reason. One
shipper, on behalf of himself and all the other shippers, brings an
action for damages against some members of the association, as
-epresenting all.16 The rights sought to be enforced against the
defendants are several, and the class action as to the plaintiffs
would come under subsection (a) (3) of Rule 23; it is a spurious
class action. But if the technical language of the rule is followed
strictly, the action as it affects the defendants must receive the
same classification, because "right" always refers to the plaintiff's
cause of action. The result is that the decree would not be
conclusive upon members of the defendant association who were
not made parties.
This is, of course, contrary to established equity practice, which
would regard the action as a true class action in so far as it affects
the defendants, and the decree as binding upon the whole class.
It is unlikely that the word "right" would receive this technical
construction, for Rule 23 would be regarded as stating merely the
established practice. Yet, any such construction might be avoided
by indicating that, for purposes of classification, the legal relations
sought to be imposed upon the defendant class, as well as the
rights sought to be enforced, are to be considered. Perhaps the
word liability best indicates those legal relations to members of
the profession. The object might be accomplished, then, by
adding the italicized words so that the first part of Rule 23 would
read:

If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such a number
of them as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all
may, on behalf of all, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants,
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or
against the class, or of the liability sought to be imposed upon
the class, is

...

The suggestions above are probably relevant only to a determination of the effect of the decree, and not to a determination of the
jurisdictional requirements.
I II.

CONTROL OF THE SUIT

Passing to the question of control of the suit, the usual statement is that the original parties who bring a representative action
have absolute control of the proceedings so that, until a decree
96
These were the facts in Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co.,
[1910] 2 K. B. 1021, except that there the defendant was a corporation.
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is given or others intervene, they may dismiss or bettle at their
discretion.17 After the intervention of other members of the
class, however, the interveners share this control."' Still, illthe
case of creditors' bills, it has been said that the appointment of a
receiver removes control of the proceedings from tile original
parties.9 Related to the question of control is the right of those
represented in the class action to bring separate suits while that
action is pending; generally it is said that they may so act. But
it has been held that they may not so sue after a decree has beei
rendered in the class action.""' One may also notice, il itbill
brought by creditors on behalf of the clas, to enforce stoclholders' liability, a prayer that all creditors be enjoined froin
bringing separate suits.'
Since the original party who brings a class action is the
active one and runs the risk of having to bear the costs, there
is good reason to say that he ought to have a free hand in the
control of the action. Nevertheless, an absolute rule to that effect
For instance, it is not settled that the
may be undesirable.
statute of limitations as against the claims of all members of the
class is in abeyance during the pendence of a suit where the
'
In fact, one well
original party dismisses or compromises."'
may doubt this result in the spurious class action, where all
claims are several and the decree is not res judicata except as to
actual parties. An unscrupulous member of the class might thus
bar the claims of other members by settling at a prol)itious time.
Subsection (c) of Rule 23, providing that no class action may be
dismissed or compromised "without the approval of the court
and on such notice to other members of the class as the court
" 7 See Thouron v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., (C.C. Tenn. 1889)
38 Fed. 673; Ball v. Bank of Bay Biscayne, (D.C. Fla. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 214.
98"But we think the true principle is that the original parties in such
representative suits retain absolute dominion and control until decree, or
until others taking the benefit of the proceedings are made actual parties to
the cause; that upon and after the coming in of new parties they properly
have a joint voice and management with the original plaintiffs in the further progress of the cause." Thouron v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry.
Co., (C.C. Tenn. 1889) 38 Fed. 673, 679. See Ayer v. Kemper, (C.C.A.
1931) 48 F. (2d) 11.
2d Cir.
59
Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co., (C.C. Pa. 1891)
46 Fed. 336.
10OMcClelland v. Rose, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1918) 247 Fed. 721; Phipps
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 945. See In
re Engelhard & Sons Co., (1914) 231 U. S.646, 34 Sup. Ct. 258, 58 L. Ed.
416.
1O1Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Central Republic Trust
Ill.
1935) 11 F. Supp. 976.
Co., (D.C.
1o2See note (1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 118, 131.
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by order may require" provides an adequate safeguard.10 2 Various
situations may demand different treatments, and the trial court may
be trusted to protect the rights of all members of the class by the
exercise of its discretion. This is a rather mild limitation on what
was considered the plaintiff's absolute power.
The rule says nothing of the right of other members of the
class to bring separate actions. Certainly such a practice destroys
some of the values of a class action. The chief justification for
allowing these separate suits is that the members represented have
no assurance that the plaintiff in the class action will prosecute
it diligently. If that is the objection, the court will permit intervention. At any rate, the right to pursue separate actions seems
to have been regarded as correlative to the plaintiff's power of
control over the class action. When dismissal of the class action
lies within the discretion of the court, the allowance of separate
suits ought also to be in its discretion. Generally, it would seem
that such actions should be enjoined, and there is ample authority
to support such power in the court where the class action is
pending. 0 3
I NTERVENTION

Being a more general problem, intervention is treated in a
separate federal rule. Equity Rule 37 recognized the right of
intervention, but phrased it in permissive language. Yet the
courts recognized that in some cases the right to intervene is
absolute. Among such cases are those where the petitioner is
represented in an action and the representation is inadequate, and
where property is within the custody of the court and distribution
or other disposition of it may affect him adversely. 104 Federal
Rule 24 states that the right to intervene in these situations is
absolute. If the representation is adequate in a true class action,
members of the class still may be permitted by the court to intervene. But since one reason given for the development of the
class action is that it is impractical to carry on the suit when the
numerous parties afe subject to constant change by death or
02

See McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder To Terminate
Suit, (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 421.
a Stockholder's
103See McClelland v. Rose, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1918) 247 Fed. 721;
Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 945:
Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Central Republic Trust Co., (D.C.
11 F. Supp. 976.
11. 1935)
10oSee Toler v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., (D.C. Tenn. 1894) 67
Fed. 168, 171. See also Galveston R. Co. v. Cowdrey, (1871) 11 Wall.
(U.S.) 459, 20 L. Ed. 199; Campbell v. Railroad Co., (C.C. Tex. 1871) 4
Fed. Cas. No. 2366 (fraud).
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alienation of the various interests, intervention as technical parties
well may be denied where the representation is adequate. 0r The
decree, of course, will permit all persons represented to come or
be brought in under it.
The same principles should be followed in permitting creditors
to intervene in a creditors' class action. The court in Stewart v.
Dunham °8 said that "it would be merely a matter of form
whether the new parties should come in as co-complainants, or
before a master, under a decree ordering a reference to prove the
claims of all persons entitled to the benefit of the decree." Still,
although they thereby submit to the jurisdiction of the court, persons who file claims are not technically parties on the record.' 01
Normally it would seem that the proceedings may be more easily
handled if intervention is curtailed. 0 8 Any creditor who files a
claim may, of course, contest the validity of any other claim, 00
but the right to intervene to oppose the proceedings after judgment
has been denied." 0 The right to intervene in reorganization proceedings has been treated elsewhere."'
The spurious class action presents a somewhat different situation. Since each party may have a different claim or defense, it
is doubtful if any party ever adequately represents any other in
all phases of the case. All persons within the class should, therefore, be allowed to intervene in order to accomplish the purposes
of the action.'1 Intervention in such a case should be regarded
lOoSee In re Engelhard & Sons Co., (1914) 231 U. S. 646, 34 Sup. Ct.
258, 58 L. Ed. 416. Intervention may be denied because of lapse of time.
See Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, (1919) 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct.
533, 63 L. Ed. 1099. There is no absolute right to intervene where
representation is adequate. Elder v. Western Mining Co., (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1922) 280 Fed. 569.
106(1885) 115 U. S. 61, 64, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 1164, 29 L. Ed. 329.
107Alexander v. Hillman, (1935) 296 U. S. 222, 56 Sup. Ct. 204; 80 L.
Ed. 192; Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Central Republic Trust
Co., (D.C. Ill. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 976, 965.
' 08In Johnson v. Waters, (1884) Ill U. S. 640, 675, 4 Sup. Ct. 619,
637, 28 L. Ed. 547, it is said that the proper procedure is a reference to a
master with an opportunity for creditors to come in and file claims; the
form of such a decree is given there. See also Myers v. Fenn, (1867) 5

Wall. (U.S.) 205, 18 L. Ed. 604; Payne v. Hook, (1869) 7 Wall. (U.S.)
425, 432, 19 L. Ed. 260.
lOsRichmond v. Irons, (1887)

121 U. S. 27, 48, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 797,

30 L. Ed. 864.
"1OForbes v. Memphis, E. P. & P. R. R., (C.C. Tex. 1872) 9 Fed. Cas.
No. 4926; see Union Trust Co. v. Jones, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1926)

16 F.

(2d) 236, 239.
"'See Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention-The Right to Intervene

and Reorganization, (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 565, 595 et seq.
112See Ayer v. Kemper, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 11.
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as auxiliary, requiring no new ground of jurisdiction to support
it.113
Federal Rule 23 on class actions follows, in general, the
pattern of the prior decisions. It may not always be a simple
problem to tell when a right is common and when several. In
that event, perhaps one may look to the incidents of the particular
categories. The concept of res judicata and the jurisdictional
requirements are inextricably bound up with the classification. In
fact, the greatest value of Federal Rule 23 is that it clarifies this
point. But res judicata is, after all, a practical working concept
to prevent parties from imposing upon the court and upon each
other, by attempting to retry cases which can fairly be called
settled. And the requirement of a particular jurisdictional amount
is designed to protect busy courts. If these points are remembered,
the classification in the rule is suggestive enough, and the decided
cases are of a sufficiently broad scope, that new cases may be
readily assimilated to the classification as they arise. The rule is
a great improvement over the vague generality of the usual code
provisions; its frank recognition of the desirability of the spurious
class action is commendable, and settles a conflict among the
decisions. The explicit requirement that the original parties
secure the consent of the court before compromising or dismissing
the action should afford more protection to the parties represented.
It also should lead to a more general prohibition against those
represented bringing separate actions, a practice which tends to
destroy one of the values of the representative action and of
codes in general, namely, avoidance of a multiplicity of suits.
2"sSee Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, (1921) 255 U. S. 356,
41 Sup. Ct. 338, 65 L. Ed. 673; Union Trust Co. v. Jones, (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1926) 16 F. (2d) 236. See also Drumright v. Texas Sugarland Co., (C.C.A.

5th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 657.

